Sense and reference in freges logic thiel c
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Moreover, this view of the nature of the Sinne of function expressions allows us to avoid making another emendation to Freges official view that Dummett is forced to make in taking such Sinne to be objects. However, if we imagine that this prohibition on obliquity in the Begriffsschrift is to stand even in its expansion, the question becomes whether the Begriffsschrift, even ideally expanded, could be able to capture statements of propositional attitudes and other statements that, in ordinary language, give rise to indirect contexts. Geach in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, P. According to the method of reading such expressions considered in the last chapter, this would be read, the truth-value of Sinne and Gedanken 63 Venuss being a planet. Thus, this function yields the Gedanke expressed by the morning star is a planet when the Sinn of the morning star is taken as value, but yields as value theSee Howard Jackson, Frege on Sense-Functions, reprinted in Essays on Frege, ed.

It may be unsaturated in respect of its employment as symbol meant to express a Sinn, for here it can have the intended Sinn only when situated between two sentences: its purpose as a symbol requires completion by a preceding and a succeeding sentence. Six years later on June 16, 1902 , as he was preparing the proofs of the second volume of the Grundgesetze, he received a letter from Bertrand Russell, informing him that one could derive a contradiction in the system he had developed in the first volume. All of Freges basic laws involve Roman letters, as do most of his theorems. Consider the claim that every number has some successor. But can't we conclude, in a parallel fashion, that truth-value cannot be the reference of a sentence, since Q thought each sentence has a different truth-value, namely one is true and the other false. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28 1987 : 115-31; George Boolos, Whence the Contradiction? The logical system contains Roman letters for expressing generalities with regard not only to objects, but also with regard to first-level and even secondlevel functions. In his translation of this sentence in Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, Hans Kaal renders Freges word Begriffsschrift as Conceptual Notation, capitalized and italicized.

Of course, the view that the Sinne of proper names could be simple descriptions such as the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander has been harshly criticized, especially by Saul Kripke. Evans further developed this line, arguing that a sense without a referent was not possible. Frege's analysis therefore preserves our intuition that John can believe that Mark Twain wrote Huckleberry Finn without believing that Samuel Clemens did. For this reason, in what follows, the focus will be on Freges mature views, and the logical system of the Grundgesetze. The indirect references of two terms which have the same customary reference need not be identical, which would explain why substitution of coreferential terms into oblique contexts does not preserve truth sentence reference. They do not stand for objects at all.

Therefore, for Frege, they cannot be taken to have the same Bedeutung. The extension of the concept from obviously referring terms to the things that they go to make up may just be a fallacy. Only once we see the full range of the problems plaguing Freges philosophy and metaphysics of logic will we be in a position even to begin to discuss possible emendations to it. The form Fa of predicate logic has assertoric force; by itself it asserts that Venus is a planet. The impetus for their introduction is to capture inferences not possible without them, including the Begriffsschrift transcription of a proof involving the Barbara syllogism of categorical logic.

He found it necessary to make changes to the Begriffsschrift reflecting these changed views. My ultimate conclusions on this issue can be found in Chapter 6. Hermes, Director of the 'Institut fUr mathematische Logik und Grund lagenforschung' in Munster, where Frege's works and letters are being prepared for publication. Thus, even a complex expression such as a a B B a is to regarded as a function name. Although he may have made remarks early in career that make his account seem substitutional,13 this is not at all true in the Grundgesetze. Partially for my own convenience in what follows, and partially to illustrate how the principles of definition are meant to work, I now define a number of signs using these rules. However, it then becomes to difficult to explain why 2 seems informative while 1 does not.

Translated as Concept Script, a formal language of pure thought modelled upon that of arithmetic, by S. For example, consider Quines skepticism of theories of meaning such as Freges because of their failure to provide a clear account of the sameness of meanings or synonymy in Freges case, the identity conditions of Sinne and Gedanken. The most common interpretation of these suggestions to be found in the secondary literaturedefended by such notable Frege scholars as Church, Furth, Geach, Parsons, Tich, Currie and Baker and Hackeris that Frege understands the Sinne of function expressions themselves to be functions in the realm of Sinn. Perhaps realizing the incoherence of the view that objects such as the True or seven are to be understood as composed an infinite number of irreconcilable ways, Frege later explicitly rejects the principle that the Bedeutung of a whole proposition is composed out of the Bedeutungen of its parts or that a the value of a function is composed of the function and argument. It was not Russells job to formulate the inference rules that would apply to Freges Begriffsschrift when expanded to include commitment to Sinne and Gedanken. One aspect of Freges logical doctrines worth examining further in this context, however, is his advocacy of the development of a distinct logical syntax, or as he called it, a Begriffsschrift, translated alternatively as conceptual notation, or concept-script. We know for example that the morning star and the evening star have the same customary Bedeutung.

Freges inference rules are syntactically formulated, and thus we must understand expressions involving Roman letters as being syntactically quite different from those involving Gothic letters. These expressions are incomplete in the sense that they contain an empty space, which, when filled, yields either a complex name referring to an object or a complete proposition. However, the reason indirect speech is not included in the Begriffsschrift of the Grundgesetze is another matter. If the evening star has the same reference as the morning star, it follows that the evening star is a body illuminated by the Sun has the same truth value as the morning star is a body illuminated by the Sun. However, perhaps of greater interest, it will also be discovered that his views contain internal problems and inconsistencies that have hitherto gone unnoticed and unaddressed for the very same reason.

And so on, for functions of more than two variables. In what follows, I shall use uppercase Roman letters early in the alphabet as schematic variables representing strings of Begriffsschrift signs. Frege then demonstrated that one could use his system to resolve theoretical mathematical statements in terms of simpler logical and mathematical notions. But it has been one of the themes of this work that Freges logical system is lacking in not including within it commitment to the entities of the third realm of Sinn. Moreover, the treatment of complete propositions as having truth-values as their Bedeutungen also aids the construction of the Begriffsschrift insofar as it allows Frege to transcribe sentential connectives such as and and or, etc. Only when the empty place is filled by a proper name does the reference of the completed sentence — its truth value — appear.